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 Problems and Recommendations 
Tests of Partnership. 
Transatlantic Cooperation in Cyber Security, 
Internet Governance, and Data Protection 
Edward Snowden’s revelations of the scope of sur-
veillance conducted by U.S. intelligence agencies have 
been the subject of much debate in Europe, especially 
in Germany. It came as a surprise to many that 
Europe’s closest political ally has been intercepting 
private communications on a large scale, even going 
so far as to wiretap high-ranking officials of the 
European Union and its member states. Moreover, the 
U.S. government has been and continues to use the 
most important Internet platforms in daily use by 
Europeans — Google, Yahoo, Amazon, and others —to 
acquire information about European citizens, through 
methods that are fundamentally opposed to European 
legal sensibilities and to the fundamental right of 
informational self-determination. These practices have 
damaged the transatlantic partnership between 
Europe and the United States and may well have re-
sulted in a breach of trust that will prove irreparable. 
Some observers argue that the two partners’ differ-
ences over the right balance between cyber security 
and data protection are ultimately irreconcilable 
because they are the product of differing geostrategic 
positions. Because U.S. engagement is more global in 
scope, the threats to U.S. security are thought to be 
more serious than those faced by Europe. For this 
reason, “Venus Europe” and “Mars America” are un-
likely to find common ground on cyber security policy 
and data protection in the near future. Indeed, the 
kinds of cooperation in global multistakeholder Inter-
net governance that have been taken for granted in 
the past may well become increasingly controversial 
in the future. 
Although relations are currently being tested, the 
transatlantic cyber partnership continues to stand on 
a solid normative and institutional foundation. Both 
sides agree on the fundamentals of Internet regula-
tion. Both are of the conviction that universal acces-
sibility to the Internet is extraordinarily useful not 
only for democratic decision-making and free markets 
but also for the future of the liberal democratic order. 
And both sides are united also in the search for effec-
tive means to limit malicious software, to fight crime, 
and to secure critical infrastructure. 
SWP Berlin 
Tests of Partnership 
March 2014 
 
 
 
5 
Problems and Recommendations 
The controversy surrounding the NSA’s espionage 
activities exposed differences in what the United States 
and EU member countries consider to be the legiti-
mate means and methods of reaching their common 
goals. It also revealed that they have different ap-
proaches to handling normative dissonance. Never-
theless, it certainly should not be misunderstood as 
an existential threat to the transatlantic partnership. 
Instead, transatlantic differences can and should be 
speedily resolved through political dialogue. Three 
major problem areas must be dealt with in this 
process. 
Global: The present mode of Internet regulation 
lopsidedly favors the United States and does not suf-
ficiently integrate the emerging powers of Brazil, 
India, South Africa, China, and Russia. The concept of 
“multistakeholder governance” may rhetorically evoke 
egalitarian fairness, but in practice camouflages the 
fact that U.S. interests and U.S. corporations are 
de facto the most important agenda setters in Internet 
governance. Financially weaker actors wield precious 
little influence in central institutions such as the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Num-
bers (ICANN) or the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). 
The United States and Europe have defended in unison 
the existing governance model for a long time. The 
recent disclosures about U.S. surveillance practices, 
however, are causing more Europeans to question the 
status quo, and a realignment with states like Brazil is 
taking place. 
Transatlantic: The EU and the United States diverge 
sharply in their views on the most important goals for 
transatlantic cooperation between national govern-
ments in the field of cyber security policy, especially 
regarding the appropriate balance of security and 
freedom. U.S. cyberspace policy is driven increasingly 
by the military logic of deterrence, which entails 
maintaining and strengthening an offensive capacity. 
Europeans, however, treat the security aspects of 
cyberspace policy as a police matter, and their main 
goal is strengthening systemic resilience and resis-
tance to attack and fraud. Accordingly, U.S. and Euro-
pean intelligence agencies differ in their areas of 
responsibility and authority, and they have acquired 
quite different attitudes regarding informational self-
determination and other civil liberties. To prevent 
these differences from degenerating into massive con-
flict, both sides must engage each other more openly. 
Success depends on the United States and Europe 
recognizing that on both sides, domestic politics limit 
the range of feasible compromise. As long as the 
United States seeks to maintain its position as a domi-
nant global power, U.S. cyberspace policy will con-
tinue to be driven by national security issues and thus 
also by the military logic of deterrence. For the EU, 
however, questions of data protection will continue to 
be of central significance as long as its approach to 
cyberspace is police-driven and focused on improving 
its defensive capacities. Only if these limits are re-
spected will mutual cooperation in cyber security 
policy and Internet governance find some middle 
ground that pays off for both sides. 
Transnational: The transatlantic cyber partnership is 
being challenged by a number of transnational con-
flicts involving different perceptions of the proper 
state-citizen relationship. Unfortunately, these require 
urgent attention at a time when mutual trust between 
states and citizens has been eroded. Disclosures have 
sensitized citizens to the dangers inherent in the 
digital revolution. It is possible that public trust in the 
safety of Internet communications has been deeply 
shaken and that some groups will begin to demand 
the renationalization of information and communica-
tion technology infrastructure. In the run-up to nego-
tiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), for example, demands for the 
creation of supranational legal instruments and in-
dependent mediating bodies are already being voiced. 
In the coming years, both the EU and the United 
States will have to get used to emerging countries like 
Brazil, India, South Africa, and Indonesia demanding 
the more frequent use of multilateral agreements in 
Internet governance within the multistakeholder 
process. 
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Multistakeholder Model 
Transatlantic Principles and Initiatives 
 
A transatlantic cyber partnership between the EU and 
the United States has developed and strengthened 
over the last several years. The policies of both regions 
share a common normative foundation and regulatory 
principles and are characterized by very similar 
domestic political debates. Both regions also share 
similar ideas about the most appropriate regulatory 
structure for the Internet.1 
The Internet’s cyberspace, as a global public space 
and an economic resource, is a public good. Because 
the Internet spans the globe, the regulatory aspira-
tions of the cyber partnership are not limited to the 
transatlantic region but rather “encompass all IT sys-
tems that are data-networked on a global scale.”2 The 
United States and the member states of the European 
Union are similar in that they all have service-based 
economies in which a large proportion of economic 
activity is transacted over the Internet. Essential eco-
nomic infrastructure, including that of the energy, 
healthcare, and transportation sectors, depends on 
stable communication channels. In addition, Internet 
usage in both economic regions has increased rapidly 
in recent years and exceeds usage in other regions of 
the world by far. About 75 percent of all European 
households are connected to the Internet; in North 
and South America, about 61 percent are connected.3 
Given these similarities, it is not surprising that the 
European Union is using the U.S. government’s Inter-
national Strategy for Cyberspace of May 2011 for guid-
ance in the development of its own unified “cyber-
space policy.” Together with international partners 
and organizations, the private sector, and civil society, 
the EU wants to create a policy that helps guarantee 
“the preservation of an open, free and secure cyber-
space” and serves to “bridge the ‘digital divide’.”4 
1  Andreas Fröhling, “Was ist Cyberdefence?,” Behörden-Spiegel, 
March 2013: 70. 
2  Bundesministerium des Innern, Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie für 
Deutschland (Berlin, February 2011), 14. 
3  International Telecommunication Union (ITU), Facts and 
Figures. The World in 2013 (Geneva, 2013). 
4  Annegret Bendiek, Marcel Dickow, and Jens Meyer, Europäi-
sche Außenpolitik und das Netz. Orientierungspunkte für eine Cyber-
Außenpolitik der EU, SWP-Aktuell 60/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2012). 
Multistakeholder Model 
Certainly the most important common feature of U.S. 
and EU Internet governance is the insight that the 
global Internet is a collective good and that its nature 
as a collective good depends on universal free online 
access.5 Both are guided by the normative principle 
that citizens should be able to use the Internet to the 
fullest extent possible, limits being acceptable only to 
prevent harm to others. Moreover, the Internet should 
be subject to national laws only insofar as the hard-
ware and software of information and communication 
technology is located within national borders. 
These shared normative principles of the trans-
atlantic cyber partnership find expression also in a 
shared understanding of how the Internet should be 
regulated. As part of the UN World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS), a dispute between China 
and the United States developed between 2002 and 
2005 over whether the Internet should be managed by 
private businesses or public authorities. In response to 
this question, the Working Group on Internet Gover-
nance (WGIG), which had been assembled by then 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, developed the 
“multistakeholder model.” Supported at that time by 
190 states, it acknowledges the fact that the Internet 
has no central governing authority but arises instead 
as a product of the interaction of all participating and 
affected stakeholders including governments, busi-
nesses, civil society actors, and the technical commu-
nity. In principle, everyone can participate in the most 
important regulatory bodies such as the Internet 
Society (ISOC), the Internet Engineering Task Force 
(IETF), or the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). The 
price of participation is “not a political declaration of 
belief, but the ability and willingness to contribute 
something to the solution of practical (Internet) prob-
5  Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2013 (Washington, DC/ 
New York, 2013), http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/ 
freedom-net/ freedom-net-2013; see also “Russischer Geheim-
dienst will komplette Internetkommunikation speichern,” 
Spiegel Online, October 21, 2013. 
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Transatlantic Principles and Initiatives 
lems.”6 The outcomes of participation should depend 
not on place of origin or membership in a particular 
electorate, but rather on the strength of argument, 
the innovative power of proposals, and the plausibility 
of misgivings. A “rough consensus” is considered to 
have been achieved when the major groups involved 
have no more fundamental objections. 
The “generic Top Level Domain” (gTLD) program of 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN)7 is an example of how political and 
economic problems can be solved in a 
multistakeholder process. The most convincing 
evidence in favor of the existing multistakeholder 
structure, however, is its robust growth. The number 
of Internet users has increased over the past 20 years 
to about 2 billion, and the openness of the Internet 
has brought forth innovative and creative applications 
that have made the Internet culturally diverse and 
economically virile.8 
The current structure is certainly not without con-
troversy. Authoritarian states such as China, Russia, 
and Iran are pushing for an Internet regime that is 
more directly tied to the United Nations and in which 
national governments again acquire broad regulatory 
latitude. A Western alliance consisting of the United 
States, EU member states, Japan, Australia, and Canada 
has successfully resisted such advances so far. Most 
of all, these countries fear that a greater role for 
UN bodies would increase the ability of authoritarian 
governments to abuse their power in intergovern-
mental cooperation. If the Domain Name System 
(DNS), for example, were no longer controlled by 
ICANN but rather by governments as part of the Inter-
national Telecommunication Union (ITU), it could be 
used as an instrument of political power to lock out 
undesired users from the Internet. The “great firewall” 
of the Chinese government and the blockade of Google 
and other websites in the “halal” network of Iran show 
that this risk is not hypothetical.9 
6  Wolfgang Kleinwächter (ed.), Internet und Demokratie, MIND 
[Multistakeholder Internet Dialog] #5; Collaboratory Discus-
sion Paper Series, no. 1 (Berlin, June 2013), 8. 
7  ICANN coordinates the Internet’s systems of unique iden-
tifiers: IP addresses, protocol parameter registries, top-level 
domain space (DNS root zone). 
8  Vint Cerf, “Reflections about the Internet and Human 
Rights: Video Keynote,” in Keep the Internet Free, Open and Secure, 
ed. Lorena Jaume-Palasi and Wolfgang Kleinwächter (Berlin, 
2013), 40f. 
9  Alex Comninos, Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Freedom of 
Association and the Internet (Melville [South Africa]: Association 
for Progressive Communications [APC], June 2012). 
The members of the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) see the current 
Internet governance regime as a neutral arrangement. 
A bill that passed the Energy and Commerce Commit-
tee of the U.S. House of Representatives called for the 
preservation of the existing model of Internet gover-
nance and spoke out against any extension of ITU 
authority over the Internet.10 Similarly, the European 
Parliament (EP) and the European Commission under-
scored their commitment to a free and open Internet 
at the 2012 World Conference on International Tele-
communications (WCIT) in Dubai.11 Yet both propo-
nents and detractors of the existing multistakeholder 
structure know that it raises governance questions 
that remain unanswered. The heated debates over 
Internet regulation in the ITU and over the introduc-
tion of new top-level domains at ICANN demonstrate 
just how important a policy tool technical standardi-
zation has become. The role of national and supra-
national political bodies in these institutions is far 
from being authoritatively defined. An even more 
delicate situation arises when individual technical 
gatekeepers are themselves able to determine tech-
nical standards, as in the browser market.12 
Domestic Debates 
The domestic political debates on Internet policy in 
the EU and the United States are very similar. Discus-
sion centers around how barrier-free access to digital 
infrastructure both in terms of geographic reach and 
speed (broadband infrastructure) can be achieved for 
as many people as possible; debates address also the 
issue of which restrictions on access are legitimate. 
10  GauthamNagesh, “An Internet (Almost) Free from Govern-
ment Control,” Roll Call, April 17, 2013, http://www.rollcall. 
com/news/an_Internet_almost_free_from_government_ 
control-224101-1.html. 
11  European Commission, Digital Agenda: EU Defends Open Inter-
net at Dubai International Telecommunications Conference, Memo/ 
12/922 (Brussels, November 30, 2012); European Parliament, 
Resolution on the Forthcoming World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT-12) of the International Telecommunica-
tion Union, and the Possible Expansion of the Scope of International 
Telecommunication Regulations, 2012/2881(RSP) (Strasbourg, 
November 22, 2012). 
12  Guido Brinkel, “Datenpolitik,” in Kompendium Digitale 
Standortpolitik, ed. AnsgarBaums and Ben Scott, (Berlin, June 
2013), 128–38 (133ff), http://www.stiftung-nv.de/ 
mstream.ashx?g=111327&a=1&ts=635215654714766229&s= 
&r=-1&id=151668&lp=635076896901470000. 
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Cybercrime and the Budapest Convention 
The European Commission presented a “digital task 
list” in December 2012, which made the creation of a 
stable regulatory environment for investment in 
broadband networks a top priority. The new “EU 
guidelines for the application of state aid rules in 
relation to the rapid deployment of broadband net-
works” has been in force since January 2013.13 The 
guidelines are intended to strengthen non-discrimina-
tory network access (“open access”) so as to encourage 
competition in publically subsidized network infra-
structures.14 
Equally controversial in the United States and the 
EU is the question of network neutrality. The Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) announced in 
2010 that it will prohibit providers from discriminat-
ing among Internet packets during transport on the 
basis of their content. Europeans, too, are debating 
whether Internet service providers may grant content 
providers (such as Facebook, YouTube, or Spotify) 
higher transport speeds for their data as a paid service. 
In September 2013, Digital Agenda Commissioner 
Neelie Kroes introduced regulations that would pro-
vide the basis for a two-class network throughout 
Europe.15 In early February 2014, House and Senate 
Democrats introduced a net neutrality bill. This bill, 
the Open Internet Preservation Act, is a response to a 
federal court decision that struck down the FCC’s 
net neutrality rules, which had prevented Internet 
providers from blocking or slowing access to certain 
websites. 
The principle of maximum possible access to the 
Internet is reflected on both sides of the Atlantic in 
what are known as “freedom online” strategies.16 In 
May 2009, the United States launched its program for 
Internet freedom.17 The EU followed in August 2012.18 
13  Official Journal of the European Union, 2013/C 25/01 (January 
26, 2013). 
14  Note that technologies developed by the Chinese firm 
Huawei are used by more than 400 telecommunications firms 
in more than 140 countries. Among its customers are 45 to 
50 of the largest telecommunications companies worldwide. 
Huawei is setting up eight of the world’s nine largest nation-
al broadband networks including those of Great Britain, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and Malaysia. “Huawei will Engagement 
beim Netzausbau ausweiten,” Behörden-Spiegel, July 2012: 19. 
15  European Commission, Commission Adopts Regulatory Pro-
posals for a Connected Continent, Memo/13/779 (Brussels, Septem-
ber 11, 2013). 
16  Richard Fontaine and Will Rogers, Internet Freedom. A For-
eign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age (Washington, DC: Center 
for a New American Security, June 2011). 
17  U.S. Department of State, 21st Century Statecraft, May 2009; 
Hillary Clinton, Remarks on Internet Freedom (Washington, DC: 
In 2012, the United States invested over $100 million 
in order to help ensure that opposition forces in coun-
tries with authoritarian regimes have continual, un-
restricted network access using “Internet in a suitcase” 
technology. This is meant to prevent those in power 
from simply turning off the Internet in conflict situa-
tions and thus to ensure that regime opponents al-
ways have the capacity to coordinate their actions on 
social networks and inform the global public. In 
response to the Arab upheavals, the United States 
forged the “Freedom Online Coalition” in 2011, with 
then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton at its head; the 
coalition now includes 19 states.19 The coalition also 
set itself the goal of ensuring that political activists in 
authoritarian states have unrestricted access to the 
Internet. With its “no disconnect” strategy, the EU 
intends to protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms both online and offline, and it seeks to ex-
pand information and communication technology 
such as to promote political freedom, democratic 
development, and economic growth.20 The EU can 
now finance these goals through its newly created 
Democracy Fund. 
Cybercrime and the Budapest Convention 
Despite ongoing differences in the substantive defini-
tion and prevalent usage of military terms like “cyber 
war,” a common corpus of important distinctions and 
categorizations has developed.21 Cybercrime has ex-
panded massively in recent years on both sides of the 
Atlantic; it is now estimated to cost German corpora-
U.S. Department of State, January 21, 2010); Fontaine and 
Rogers, Internet Freedom (see note 16), 11–13. 
18  “European Parliament Calls for Digital Freedom,” Bulletin 
Quotidien Europe, no. 10749 (December 12, 2012); European 
Parliament, Draft Report on a Digital Freedom Strategy in EU 
Foreign Policy, 2012/2094 (INI) (Strasbourg, August 24, 2012); 
Ben Wagner, “Freedom of Expression on the Internet: Impli-
cations for Foreign Policy,” Global Information Society Watch, 
(2011): 20–22. 
19  Guido Westerwelle, “Die Freiheit im Netz,” in Frankfurter 
Rundschau, May 27, 2011; “Im Spagat zur Internetfreiheit,” 
Deutsche Welle, June 20, 2013. 
20  European Commission, A Partnership for Democracy and 
Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean, Joint Commu-
nication, COM(2011) 200 final (Brussels, March 8, 2011). 
21  Sandro Gaycken, “Cybersicherheitsfragen und –antwor-
ten,” in Kompendium Digitale Standortpolitik, ed. Baums and 
Scott (see note 12), 178­182; also Thomas Rid, Cyber War Will 
Not Take Place (London, 2013); A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyber-
space. 1986 to 2012, ed. Jason Healey (Vienna, VA, 2013). 
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Transatlantic Principles and Initiatives 
tions alone an average of €4.8 million annually. Al-
though this figure is lower than the €6.9 million 
estimated for U.S. firms, it is higher than the values 
for Japan (€3.9 million), Australia (€2.6 million), and 
the UK (€2.5 million).22 Corporations in the U.S. sample 
reported 1.8 successful attacks per week and that costs 
incurred due to these attacks had been rising annually 
by about 40 percent. Crimes such as trade credit fraud 
and industrial espionage occur with similar frequency 
in Europe. The Internet has also opened up a new 
international space for criminal offenses. The biggest 
challenges for investigators in the fight against cyber-
crime include skimming, phishing, carding, malware, 
botnets, DDoS attacks, account takeovers, and under-
ground markets like Silk Road 2.0 that utilize the 
virtual currency Bitcoin and are often hidden in 
TOR networks. These new phenomena are flexible, 
dynamic, expansive, and, above all, anonymous.23 
Probably the most important document in the 
transatlantic fight against cybercrime is the Conven-
tion on Cybercrime, also known as the Budapest Con-
vention,24 which regulates the cooperation of all 
Council of Europe member states, the United States, 
Canada, Japan, and South Africa.25 The convention is 
the first international treaty intended to harmonize 
national criminal law and criminal prosecution in the 
areas of Internet and Internet-related crime. It was a 
reaction to the problem that national provisions 
regarding criminally relevant behavior in the Internet 
are extraordinarily heterogeneous and contain 
numerous loopholes. Effective legal protection is also 
hampered by the absence of standard definitions 
regarding which acts are punishable by law and by the 
lack of agreement over whether information about 
suspected criminals can be shared. In this legal 
environment, it is not difficult for extremists to build 
online forums in countries that have not ratified 
mutual legal assistance treaties or where the issues 
discussed online are not criminal offenses. In closed 
forums, even terrorist plots can be freely discussed. 
22  Ponemon Institute, 2012 Cost of Cyber Crime Study: United 
States (Traverse City, MI: October 2012); also Bundesverband 
der Deutschen Industrie (BDI), Sicherheit für das Industrieland 
Deutschland. Grundsatzpapier (Berlin, June 2013), 10. 
23  LiorTabansky, “Cybercrime: A National Security Issue?,” 
Military and Strategic Affairs 4, no. 3 (December 2012): 117­36. 
24  Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest, 
November 23, 2001). 
25  Czech Republic, Greece, Ireland, Poland and Sweden have 
not yet ratified the convention, Nikolaj Nielsen, “EU Seeks 
U.S. Help to Fight Cyber Criminals,” EUobserver, May 2, 2012. 
The convention, which went into effect in 2004, covers 
a wide range of criminal offenses in the attempt to 
compensate for these gaps. It sets criteria for ascertain-
ing whether a crime has been committed and enumer-
ates appropriate measures to be taken by state authori-
ties against such breaches of the law. It encompasses 
fraud, child pornography, infringement of intellectual 
property rights, and intrusion into computer systems 
belonging to others. The agreement represents a major 
advance toward creating a common judicial area. 
Despite its significance for the prosecution of cyber-
crime, the convention has in no way brought about 
complete harmonization. One stubborn point of con-
flict is the often insufficient implementation of the 
convention by its European signatories, the prime 
example being the difficulties some countries have 
experienced in making data retention legally manda-
tory despite the clear implications of the Budapest 
Convention. Another problem is the prohibition on 
the dissemination of racist propaganda. In a number 
of countries — including the United States, Russia, 
China, Brazil, and India — a ban is not possible because 
of overriding protections for the freedom of expres-
sion or because of other national legal principles. 
The Military Dimension of Cyber Security and 
the Tallinn Manual 
The so-called Tallinn Manual represents an important 
foundation for transatlantic cooperation in respond-
ing to militarily relevant cyber threats. The manual is 
designed to assist in adapting essential principles of 
international law to the conditions of the cyber age. At 
the invitation of NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defence 
Centre of Excellence, a group of eminent international 
law scholars met in Tallinn, Estonia to formulate a 
total of 95 guidelines for governmental reactions to 
cyber attacks. The first working document was pub-
lished in March 2013.26 It provides a mutual point of 
reference for converging and diverging European and 
U.S. definitions of military attack, distinctions between 
civilian and military targets, and methods of establish-
ing which parties are or were involved in specific 
26  Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber 
Warfare. Prepared by the International Group of Experts at the 
Invitation of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, 
ed. Michael N. Schmitt (Cambridge et al., 2013). 
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cyberspace conflicts. NATO officials describe it as “the 
most important legal document of the cyber era.”27 
The manual declares that, in principle, the provi-
sions of the Charter of the United Nations are appli-
cable to cyber attacks.28 It appeals to nations not to 
treat cyberspace as a legal vacuum in which legal 
principles applying to physical space are invalid. On 
the contrary, whenever states or the international 
community respond to cyber attacks, they are obliged 
to ensure that their responses comply with the 
requirements of international law.29 The document 
specifies when and under what conditions an act of 
war has been committed and what measures states 
may take to retaliate. Rule 13 asserts that if cyber 
activity crosses the threshold of an armed assault in 
the sense of Article 51 of the UN Charter, states should 
be entitled to exercise their inherent right of self-
defense. In these stipulations, the manual lays the 
cornerstone for the principle that cyber operations, 
if they result in serious damage and deaths, may be 
answered with the weapons of real war. 
The authors of the manual do not provide clear 
criteria by which an attack may be defined as an act of 
war.30 This question, they write, must be assessed case 
by case in reference to the decision’s potential effects 
and gravity. Although pure cyber espionage is not 
considered an act of war under the Tallinn rules, spy-
ing attacks that could be interpreted as preparation 
for a destructive assault certainly may be answered 
with a preventive strike against the spy. States may 
claim their right to self-defense if an attacker is a state 
or even an organized group, but not if the attack is 
initiated by an individual. Also, information leaks 
cannot on principle be answered militarily unless they 
exceed a critical threshold such that they make casual-
ties imminently possible. 
The authors of the manual also take a position on 
the conditions that justify preemptive action against 
27  Thomas Darnstädt, Marcel Rosenbach and Gregor Peter 
Schmitz, “Cyberwar: Ausweitung der Kampfzone,” in Der 
Spiegel, no. 14 (March 30, 2013): 76­79. 
28  See further Harold Hongju Koh, International Law in Cyber-
space (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, September 
18, 2012), http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/ 
197924.htm. 
29  Interview with Michael Schmitt in “Das Internet ist jetzt 
Teil des Waffenarsenals,” New Scientist Deutschland, April 19, 
2013: 56f; Nils Melzer, “95 Thesen für den korrekten Cyber-
krieg,” New Scientist Deutschland, March 28, 2013: 6. 
30  Tallinn Manual (see note 26), Chapter II: “The Use of Force,” 
Section 1: “Prohibition of the Use of Force.” 
cyber attacks,31 allowing it when an attack is “immi-
nent.”32 The crux of the matter, however, lies in defin-
ing “imminent.” The use of Stuxnet against the Iranian 
nuclear program is seen, for example, by some “as an 
act of preventive self-defense.”33 Some authors even 
argue that “catastrophic” economic damage could 
justify retaliation and could trigger self-defense mea-
sures or Security Council sanctions under Article 39 
of the UN Charter. In simulations conducted by the 
experts in Tallinn, a cyber attack that disrupted the 
New York Stock Exchange for several days was ruled to 
have been serious enough to justify actions of self-
defense. 
The Tallinn Manual is not without controversy. 
Critics point out that using international law to set up 
rules for cyber war just makes these kinds of actions 
seem more doable and that there is no precedent for 
norms that deal with conflict below the threshold of 
armed assault. Moreover, the exclusion from the talks 
of experts from non-NATO states is criticized as having 
limited the scope of group discussions. 
Joint Transatlantic Initiatives 
Times are changing for the transatlantic cyber partner-
ship. The direction and speed of change is periodically 
evolving through initiatives in the context of NATO, 
EU-U.S. cooperation, bilateral cooperation between the 
United States and individual EU member states, and 
confidence and security building measures toward 
third parties. 
NATO’s Strategic Concept 2010 is currently the core 
document for transatlantic security issues. Although 
cyber security is a marginal theme in the paper, it is 
clearly of growing concern to NATO: “Cyber attacks 
are becoming more frequent, more organized, and 
more costly in the damage that they inflict on govern-
ment administrations, businesses, economies, and 
potentially also transportation and supply networks 
31  Ellen Nakashima, “In Cyberwarfare, Rules of Engagement 
Still Hard to Define,” The Washington Post, March 10, 2013; 
John Arquilla, “Panetta’s Wrong about a Cyber ‘Pearl Har-
bor’,” Foreign Policy, November 19, 2012. 
32  Tallinn Manual (see note 26), Chapter II: “The Use of Force,” 
Section 2: “Self-Defence.” 
33  A critical assessment provided by James A. Lewis, “In 
Defense of Stuxnet,” Military and Strategic Affairs 4, no. 3 (2012): 
65­76. Herbert Lin, “Escalation Dynamics and Conflict Termi-
nation in Cyberspace,” Strategic Studies Quarterly 6, no. 3 
(Autumn 2012): 46­70. 
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and other critical infrastructure.”34 Such attacks “can 
reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-
Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability.”35 NATO 
concludes that military defense measures are there-
fore necessary and should aim to further develop the 
alliance’s capacity to “prevent, detect, defend against, 
and recover from cyberattacks.”36 This necessitates 
building state capacities and improving cooperation 
among NATO member states and between these states 
and NATO. The Strategic Concept takes no position on 
the question of whether cyber attacks can be used to 
justify invoking Article 5 of the NATO charter (the col-
lective defense clause) or whether cyber attacks might 
be met with a collective response. The vast majority of 
states seems to prefer leaving this question open so 
that each case can be decided individually in light of 
the specific situation. 
NATO clarified its policy when it adopted its Cyber 
Defense Policy in June 2011 and an Action Plan three 
months later. With these steps, NATO has begun to 
build an institutionalized cyber defense structure to 
coordinate member states’ defense plans.37 It is strik-
ing, however, that only a few NATO member states 
have shown strong interest in implementing the 
action plan or in participating in NATO cyber exer-
cises, and neither Britain nor France belong to the 
active group. In April 2013, NATO and Russia an-
nounced their intention to extend cooperation in 
cyber security to the NATO-Russia Council level. 
The EU-U.S. Working Group on Cyber Security and 
Cyber Crime was established in November 2010. It is 
addressing the fact that in many cases cyber attacks 
cannot immediately be attributed to a specific actor; 
this often requires a long “forensic” investigation, and 
sometimes the real perpetrator is never found. The 
first joint exercise of the EU and the United States, in 
November 2011, (“Cyber Atlantic 2011”) was designed 
to improve coordination and provide a more detailed 
analysis of vulnerabilities. Based on its results, the 
EU held its second European cyber security exercise 
(“Cyber Europe 2012”), in which more than 500 ex-
perts from 29 EU/EFTA states participated. The goals of 
34  NATO, Active Engagement, Modern Defence (Lisbon, November 
20, 2010), 11. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid., 16. 
37  “Nato/Defence: Nato Prepares Roadmap for Cyber-
Defence,” Europe Diplomacy &Defence, no. 587 (February 26, 
2013); Gerd Lehmann, “Schlüssel zum Erfolg. Kohärentes 
Führungs- und Aufklärungssystem für NATO und EU,” 
Behörden-Spiegel (December 2011): 54. 
the exercise were to make critical national and Euro-
pean infrastructure more robust and to strengthen 
cooperation, preparedness, and response capability in 
case of a cyber security event. The Working Group is 
planning a joint “month of cyber security” in 2014 
during which the coordination of U.S. and EU defense 
mechanisms is to be improved. 
Cooperation in Trust-Building Measures 
In many areas, cyberspace policy has direct military 
relevance. With the goal of preventing a new arms 
race in cyberspace policy, since 2011, the EU and the 
United States have launched a number of joint initia-
tives to establish confidence and security building 
measures in relations with Russia and China. Discus-
sions about these measures have been conducted in 
the United Nations, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the G8, and in several 
conferences including the Munich Security Confer-
ence, the London Conference on Cyberspace with 
follow-up events in Budapest and Seoul, and the Berlin 
Conference on International Cyber Security. Inter-
national organizations and forums also address them-
selves to cyber security, including the OECD, the ITU 
Global Cyber Security Agenda, the Internet Gover-
nance Forum (established in the wake of the UN World 
Summit on the Information Society), and the G20. 
These discussions are taking place in an environment 
characterized by fundamentally different views about 
the appropriate objectives of cyberspace regulation. 
EU member states and the United States place great 
emphasis on unrestricted access to cyberspace and on 
the freedom of its content and use. Russia, China, and 
other authoritarian states, however, are much more 
interested in tighter controls.38 In authoritarian states, 
“cyber security” means suppressing politically un-
desired content and creating new tools to repress 
dissidents; the development and implementation of 
confidence and security building measures are often 
handicapped by these objectives, which are diametri-
cally opposed to the goals of the transatlantic partner-
ship. For the EU and the United States, access to cyber-
space and the freedom of its content and use — within 
the limits of legal and democratic principles — remain 
the central reference points for judging the value of 
38  For more details on the differing positions see citizenlab.org. 
For the U.S. perspective, see Richard A. Clarke and Robert K. 
Knake, Cyber War (New York, 2010), Chapter 7. 
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security measures. Such measures must show defer-
ence to the goal of responsible and reasonable state 
action in cyberspace and sensitivity to the tension 
between security in cyberspace and freedom of 
information. 
Multilateral international treaties akin to those 
used for disarmament and arms control are currently 
unfeasible in the area of cyber security because of 
elementary differences separating the United States 
and Europe from Russia and China over the use of 
military operations in cyberspace.39 Their differences 
are entrenched in several areas: implementation and 
verification, the definition of cyber weapons, and the 
attribution of attacks under international law or 
national criminal law. EU member states are working 
closely with the United States, Canada, Japan, and 
Australia in the UN and in the OSCE to develop a code 
of conduct for state behavior in cyberspace.40 A group 
of 15 government representatives was given a man-
date to this end from the UN General Assembly. It 
submitted a final report on responsible state behavior 
in cyberspace to the 68th General Assembly in June 
2013; the group also proposed confidence and security 
building measures. At the same time, bilateral dia-
logues are booming as a way of cutting through the 
profound differences separating democratic and 
authoritarian states.41 The United States and Germany 
have separately entered into special agreements with 
Russia and have started talks with China. These ex-
changes focus on priority-setting within risk assess-
ment procedures and the standards and norms for 
state behavior in cyberspace currently being nego-
tiated in the UN GGE (Group of Governmental Experts 
of the United Nations).42 Here, too, however, serious 
differences are evident. Russia wants to outlaw the use 
of cyber weapons in general.43 The United States does 
not. Assumedly, the U.S. position is motivated by its 
39   James A. Lewis, “Multilateral Agreements to Constrain 
Cyberconflict,”Arms Control Today40, no. 5 (June 2010): 14­19. 
40  Tim Maurer, Cyber Norm Emergence at the United Nations. An 
Analysis of the UN’s Activities Regarding Cyber-security (Cambridge, 
MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
September 2011). 
41  “Russia, U.S. Will Try to Reach Agreements on Rules 
Governing Information Security – Newspaper,” Interfax, April 
29, 2013; “U.S., China Discuss Cyber Security as Dialogue 
Begins,” Voice of America, July 9, 2013. 
42  Jane Perlez, “U.S. and China Put Focus on Cybersecurity,” 
The New York Times, April 22, 2013. 
43  Rex Hughes, “A Treaty for Cyberspace,” International Affairs 
86, no. 2 (2010): 523–41. Draft Convention on International Infor-
mation Security (Yekaterinburg, September 2011). 
technical superiority in the area and the difficulty of 
reliably monitoring compliance with such agreements. 
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In spite of wide areas of consensus between the United 
States and EU member states regarding the norms 
and principles that should govern cyberspace and the 
Internet, the transatlantic relationship is still hectored 
by serious conflicts. These include different ideas 
about the best mode of global Internet governance 
(global conflicts), very different cyber security con-
cepts for the transatlantic partnership (transatlantic 
conflicts), and disruptions in the regulation of rela-
tions between states and citizens due to actions taken 
by partner nations (transnational conflicts). A separate 
matter, important but not covered here, is the U.K.’s 
reservations about what it sees as an overly harmo-
nized approach to interior and justice policy within 
the EU and the impact of the British position on trans-
atlantic cooperation. 
Global Conflicts 
The Multistakeholder Approach 
A first important point of conflict emerged around the 
pre-existing multistakeholder model of Internet gover-
nance. Several emerging high-growth countries — in-
cluding Brazil, India, South Africa, Turkey, and Indo-
nesia — consider themselves to be insufficiently 
represented in organizations such as ICANN and IGF, 
and are pressing for a greater role for intergovern-
mental bodies such as the ITU. To date, the ITU has 
limited itself to standardization and building tech-
nical capacity in developing countries. Its mandate 
was basically limited to the management of the treaty 
on International Telecommunication Regulations 
(ITR), by which the global interconnection and inter-
operability of the telephone system is ensured. During 
the World Conference on International Telecommuni-
cations (WCIT) in December 2012 in Dubai, a conflict 
escalated between the United States, Europe, and 
other Western countries and the IBSA/BRICS nations. 
The latter demanded that the ITR contract be renego-
tiated, with the goal of extending its reach to the 
Internet and significantly expanding the powers of the 
intergovernmental ITU.44 Their intention was to break 
U.S. hegemony in the management of the Internet and 
to create a new order in which the states of the south 
would have more weight. 
These demands were met with little enthusiasm 
by the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, and 
Canada. The Western states refused to call the multi-
stakeholder model into question or to outfit the ITU 
with new powers. They even rejected a modest com-
promise proposal to append to the ITR some general 
statements about the “cooperation of governments on 
spam” and “network security” as well as a non-binding 
declaration on the involvement of the ITU in Internet 
regulation.45 
On the heels of Edward Snowden’s revelations in the 
summer of 2013, some cracks seem to have emerged 
for the first time in the wall put up by Western states 
to prevent a reorganization of Internet governance. 
The EU has not dropped its support of the multistake-
holder approach, but its insistence on a more com-
prehensive inclusion of democratic countries such as 
Brazil and India has become more urgent, as seen in 
EU Commissioner Neelie Kroes’ recent demand for 
greater inclusivity and transparency.46  She argued 
that past practice, characterized by the unilateral 
dominance of the United States and its allies in bodies 
such as ICANN, needs to be corrected. Unlike the 
United States, the EU seeks to strengthen the Govern-
mental Advisory Committee (GAC) of ICANN and with 
it the principle of intergovernmentalism. In June 
2013, the European Commission also proposed to set 
up a Global Internet Policy Observatory in cooperation 
with Brazil, the African Union, Switzerland, and some 
non-governmental organizations. Its goal is to provide 
44  Ben Scott and Tim Maurer, “Digitale Entwicklungspoli-
tik,” in Kompendium Digitale Standortpolitik, ed. Baums and 
Scott (see note 12), 126f; Hannes Ebert and Tim Maurer, “Con-
tested Cyberspace and Rising Powers,” Third World Quarterly 
34, no. 6 (2013): 1054–1074. 
45  Tim Maurer, What Is at Stake at WCIT? An Overview of WCIT 
and the ITU’s Role in Internet Governance (Washington, DC: New 
America Foundation, Open Technology Institute, December 5, 
2012); Isabel Skierka, “Kampf um die Netzherrschaft,” Adlas – 
Magazin für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik 7, no. 1 (2013): 12­16. 
46  Neelie Kroes, Building a Connected Continent, SPEECH/13/741 
(Brussels: European Commission, September 24, 2013). 
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more transparency and open up new avenues of parti-
cipation in Internet governance. 
Brazil and Germany have proposed supplementing 
and expanding the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights — adopted by the UN in 1966 and 
in force since 1976 — for the digital world. An over-
whelming majority of the 193 UN member states sup-
port this initiative. Regardless of the inherent value of 
such initiatives and whether they have a real chance 
of changing existing structures of Internet gover-
nance, it is becoming very clear that not only the EU 
but also other countries such as Brazil, India, Turkey, 
and Indonesia will increase pressure on the United 
States and that demands for an order that is more 
inclusive for emerging democracies can no longer be 
brushed aside.47 
Technological Sovereignty 
Snowden’s disclosures not only bolstered calls for a 
reorganization of Internet governance, they also set 
off a push for stricter national control of communica-
tions infrastructures. To this end, the European Com-
mission put forward a strategy for “Unleashing the 
potential of cloud computing in Europe” in September 
2012.48 Although this initiative was originally primari-
ly intended to create jobs, after U.S. surveillance 
practices became common knowledge, the issue of 
“data sovereignty” was pushed to the fore. The cloud 
computing strategy envisages further harmonization 
in the technical standards used by member states. In 
addition, it calls for an EU-wide certification system 
for trusted cloud providers and for model drafts of 
secure and fair contracts. The Commission favors the 
establishment of a European Cloud Partnership link-
ing member states and the computing industry, in 
order to better utilize public power over the sector’s 
markets. The goal is to strengthen European cloud 
providers, helping them achieve efficiencies of scale 
and compete more successfully with their U.S. com-
petitors. 
The European Commission believes that an EU-wide 
cloud computing system is needed to protect Euro-
47  Internet Governance Project (IGP), Comments of the Internet 
Governance Project on the ICANN Transition, June 2009; IGP, The 
Core Internet Institutions Abandon the U.S. Government, October 11, 
2013. 
48  European Commission, Unleashing the Potential of Cloud 
Computing in Europe, COM (2012) 529 final (Brussels, Septem-
ber 27, 2012). 
pean public authorities and private companies from 
espionage. Files that are stored on cloud platforms 
such as Dropbox, Google Drive, or Skydrive can be-
come a serious security problem. Typical dangers lurk 
in servers that are physically located outside Europe; 
and also in the wording of general terms and condi-
tions, which often gives quite far-reaching access 
rights to server providers. Under these conditions, 
U.S. authorities can easily gain access to the data of 
Europeans who use the cloud-computing services of 
companies like Google, Facebook, or Dropbox. Finally, 
theft of private content, like that recently experienced 
by Dropbox, cannot be completely ruled out.  
The European Parliament’s Committee on Civil 
Liberties, Justice, and Home Affairs commissioned a 
study in 2012 that showed that cloud computing is a 
relevant security risk, particularly when data is stored 
on the servers of U.S. providers.49 Law scholars of the 
University of Amsterdam pointed out in November 
2012 that the Patriot Act gives U.S. intelligence agen-
cies extensive access rights to communications and 
user data.50 On the basis of the Patriot Act and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act 
(FISAA) of 2008, which was extended to 2017, U.S. in-
vestigators may request a secret court authorization to 
monitor foreign users. The laws require U.S. cloud 
providers such as Google or Amazon to release cus-
tomer data on request, optionally with the obligation 
to keep the transaction secret, regardless of whether 
this data is stored on servers located in Europe or the 
United States. These rules apply also to European 
firms doing business in the United States. The authors 
of the EP study recommended giving top priority to 
legal certainty in cloud computing. The EU’s objective, 
they write, should be to place at least 50 percent of EU 
services offered from cloud computers within the 
jurisdiction of EU law by the year 2020.51 
In Germany, the concept of technological sovereign-
ty has been circulating for some years and has had 
active supporters in the government. For example, 
German Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière made a 
point of campaigning for technological sovereignty in 
49  Didier Bigo et al., Fighting Cyber Crime and Protecting Privacy 
in the Cloud (Brussels: EP, October 2012); Didier Bigo et al., 
National Programmes for Mass Surveillance of Personal Data in EU 
Member States and Their Compatibility with EU Law (Brussels: EP, 
October 2013). 
50  J. V. J. van Hoboken et al., Cloud Computing in Higher Educa-
tion and Research Institutions and the United States Patriot Act 
(Amsterdam: Institute for Information Law, November 2012). 
51  Bigo et al., Fighting Cyber Crime (see note 49), 50. 
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June 2010.52 The German federal government outlined 
an initial response to U.S. espionage activities in an 
eight-point plan presented in July 2013. This set of 
measures is supposed to help facilitate new security 
standards and improve access to venture capital for 
entrepreneurs interested in providing secure online 
services based on European data protection guidelines. 
At the European level, too, the government supports 
an ambitious IT strategy to promote Internet-based 
business models that are sensitive to issues of user 
security. New start-ups are to be encouraged and 
supported financially. The debate over the technology 
policy implications of the NSA’s activity also led 
Deutsche Telekom’s idea of “Schengen Routing.” 
A global paradigm shift in information and com-
munication technology is taking shape as confidence 
in the free interplay of market forces has been shaken 
and, for the first time in the digital age, the physical 
location of a company’s headquarters has become a 
decisive criterion of IT system security. Trustworthi-
ness is the issue now, and “foreign” companies are 
treated with suspicion. Attention is drawn to the pre-
ponderance of U.S. firms among the world’s IT com-
panies and to the fact that most IT equipment is 
manufactured in Asia. The solution for countering 
these monopolies would seem to be the creation of 
“national” technologies. 
Transatlantic Conflicts 
The cyber security policy of the United States and the 
EU is characterized by two very different basic ideas. 
In the United States, the logic of military defense and 
deterrence dominates. For Europeans, security lies 
squarely in the purview of police authorities and, 
where present, Computer Emergency Response Teams 
(CERTs), whose central goal is strengthening domestic 
capacities to recover from cyber attacks (resilience) or 
resist them in the first place. 
U.S. Strategy: Toward Cyber Deterrence 
Cyber defense and deterrence is of central importance 
to the United States and is coordinated by the Penta-
gon’s United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), 
52  Thomas de Maizière, 14 Thesen zu den Grundlagen einer 
gemeinsamen Netzpolitik der Zukunft (Berlin: Bundesministerium 
des Innern, June 22, 2010). 
which was created in 2010 and has about 900 employ-
ees. Cyber Command is located in Fort Meade, Mary-
land, also the headquarters of the National Security 
Agency (NSA), the largest U.S. intelligence agency, and 
shares a double-hatted commander with the NSA. 
Reporting to the United States Strategic Command 
(USSTRATCOM), Cyber Command’s mandate is to co-
ordinate defense operations against potential attacks 
(Computer Network Defense) and at the same time to 
build an offensive attack capability (Cyber Attack 
Operations).53 The fact that Cyber Command employ-
ees are to be quintupled to about 4,900 gives some 
indication of the importance the United States places 
on these measures. Thirteen cyber attack teams are to 
be formed for carrying out so-called cyber-kinetic 
attacks, i.e., cyber attacks that destroy objects.54 
The outstanding importance of the security agenda 
is also reflected in its financial resources. The Pentagon 
requested $4.7 billion for operations in this area in 
2014, about $1 billion more than in 2013. Over the 
next four years, another $23 billion is to be spent.55 
For their work, the U.S. government budgeted a total 
of $52.6 billion for the fiscal year 2013, as Edward 
Snowden revealed to The Washington Post.56 The largest 
amount, $14.7 billion, was requested by the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). The NSA, which specializes 
in electronic communications spying, put in the 
second largest request of $10.8 billion. The National 
Reconnaissance Office (NRO), responsible for spy satel-
lites, had the third largest request with $10.3 billion. 
Together, these three agencies were responsible for 
two-thirds of the intelligence budget.  
According to news magazine Der Spiegel,57 the NSA 
and CIA operate secret listening posts, internally 
referred to as the Special Collection Service (SCS), in 
53  James Bamford, The Shadow Factory. The Ultra-Secret NSA from 
9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America (New York, 2008). 
54  “Pentagon Reviews ‘Rules of Engagement’ against Cyber 
Attacks,” Europe Diplomacy &Defence, no. 620 (July 4, 2013). 
55  James Bamford, “The Secret War. Infiltration. Sabotage. 
Mayhem. For Years, Four Star General Keith Alexander Has 
Been Building A Secret Army Capable of Launching Devastat-
ing Cyberattacks,” Wired, June 12, 2013. 
56  Barton Gellman and Greg Miller, “U.S. Spy Network’s Suc-
cesses, Failures and Objectives Detailed in ‘Black Budget’ 
Summary,” The Washington Post, August 29, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/national/ 
black-budget/. 
57  “Embassy Espionage: The NSA’s Secret Spy Hub in Berlin,” 
Der Spiegel, October 17, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/ 
international/germany/cover-story-how-nsa-spied-on-merkel-
cell-phone-from-berlin-embassy-a-930205.html. 
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about 80 U.S. embassies and consulates. The small SCS 
teams collect communications in their respective host 
countries from bases in various diplomatic missions. 
This type of technical reconnaissance is known within 
the NSA by the codename “stateroom.” 
The cyber security policy of the United States is 
driven by the perception, which pervades government 
at all levels, that national security is under threat and 
that this threat must be countered by military strategy 
and military means by building “cyberpower”: 
... the ability to obtain preferred outcomes 
through use of the electronically inter-
connected information resources of the 
cyberdomain. Cyberpower can be used to 
produce preferred outcomes within cyber-
space, or it can use cybersinstruments to 
produce preferred outcomes within cyber-
space, or it can use cyberinstruments to pro-
duce preferred outcomes in other domains 
outside cyberspace.58 
Just two years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
the White House published its National Strategy to 
Secure Cyberspace.59 At that time, it positioned U.S. 
cyber security policy in the context of anti-terror 
measures and addressed itself specifically to the threat 
posed by non-state actors.60 Over the next few years, 
however, this view became relativized by additional 
analyses of the cyber risks posed by China and Russia. 
The key elements of current U.S. cyber security 
policy are deterrence and building a credible threat of 
massive retaliation.61 In May 2011, the United States 
published its International Strategy for Cyberspace, in 
which it leaves no doubt that it will respond to any 
hostile act in cyberspace with appropriate counter-
measures: “When warranted, the United States will 
respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to 
58  Joseph S. Nye, The Future of Power (New York, 2011), Chap-
ter 5. A critical assessment on “deterrence” written by 
Stevens, “A Cyberwar of Ideas?” 
59  Neil Robinson et al., Cyber-security Threat Characterisation. 
A Rapid Comparative Analysis (Cambridge: RAND Europe, 2013), 
28­32. 
60  Joseph S. Nye, “What Is It That We Really Know about 
Cyber Conflict?,” The Daily Star, April 24, 2012. 
61  Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 
Cybersecurity Two Years Later. A Report of the CSIS Commission on 
Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency (Washington, DC, January 
2011). 
any other threat to our country.”62 Only two months 
later, the Department of Defense announced that 
attacks on critical infrastructure in the United States 
will trigger reprisals.63 The then Secretary of Defense 
Leon Panetta warned that the United States risked a 
“cyber Pearl Harbor” if it did not expand its defenses.64 
In the words of former Marine Corps general and vice 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff James Cartwright, 
author of the Pentagon’s current cyber strategy, “we 
really need to frighten our enemies.”65 
Deterrence against attacks from cyberspace is high-
ly controversial, both in the literature and in political 
discussions. Many experts argue that because attackers 
often cannot be identified unequivocally, deterrence 
does not work. Even the United States government has 
officially stated that it expects to be able to trace only 
one-third of cyber attacks to a particular source.66 A 
report by U.S. cyber security company Mandiant, how-
ever, claims that U.S. intelligence and military organi-
zations know far more about the clandestine activities 
of potential attackers than they admit publicly.67 The 
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission 
recommended strongly in its November 2013 report to 
Congress that the U.S. government respond compre-
hensively to Chinese cyber espionage. The commission 
is considering trade restrictions, bans on travel to 
the United States for organizations with contacts to 
hackers, and freezing the funds of companies that use 
intellectual property stolen by cyber espionage. Exist-
ing sanctions could be intensified.68 
This approach is based on the assumption that 
basic mechanisms of deterrence also work in the 
62  The White House, International Strategy for Cyberspace. Pros-
perity, Security, and Openness in a Networked World (Washington, 
DC, May 2011). 
63  Thomas M. Chen, An Assessment of the Department of Defense 
Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2013). 
64  Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, “Panetta Warns of 
Dire Threat of Cyberattack on U.S.,” TheNew York Times, 
October 11, 2012. 
65  Original quote in Darnstädt, Rosenbach and Schmitz, 
“Cyberwar” (see note 27). 
66  Original quote in “Sicherheitsexperte Lewis über Cyber-
Krieg: ‘Wir müssen unsere Verteidigung stärken’” (Interview 
with James Lewis), Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 5, 2012, 16. 
67  APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units (Alexan-
dria, VA: Mandiant, 2013). 
68  U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 
2013 Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC, November 20, 
2013), http://www.uscc.gov/Annual_Reports/2013-annual-report-
congress. 
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digital age.69 Initial proposals for a cyber deterrence 
strategy include expanding military strength, building 
and maintaining a first-strike capacity, and upholding 
the possibility of responding militarily to a cyber 
attack in near real-time.70 The technological and scien-
tific dominance of the United States must be preserved 
by building these capacities. The United States must 
be able to quickly identify the goals and motives of 
potential attackers and must be able to take appropri-
ate countermeasures. That U.S. cyber security measures 
are not merely defensive is clearly seen in the fact that 
the U.S. intelligence community launched 231 offen-
sive cyber operations in 2011 alone. A $652 million 
project code-named GENIE employed 1,870 computer 
specialists to penetrate foreign networks.71 
EU Strategy: Building Defensive Capacity and 
Fighting Crime 
Europeans take a fundamentally different approach to 
cyber security, focusing on building capacities to resist 
cyber attacks, to recover after attacks take place (resil-
ience), and to combat crime. EU policy has four major 
components that find articulation in various forms 
and contexts: the 2013 Cyber Security Strategy pre-
sented by the European Commission and the Europe-
an External Action Service, the draft directive for 
Network and Information Security (NIS), the European 
Cybercrime Centre (EC3), and several projects designed 
to boost resistance and resilience capacities. 
The European Cyber Security Strategy72 was adopted 
in June 2013. It aims to ensure the security of informa-
69  Tim Stevens, “A Cyberwar of Ideas? Deterrence and Norms 
in Cyberspace,” Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 1 (2012): 
148­70; Paul-Anton Krüger, “Digitale Abschreckung. Die 
United States sind bereit, Cyberangriffe mit aller Härte zu 
beantworten,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, February 21, 2013, 4. 
70  Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash and George C. Salmoi-
raghi, “A Blueprint for Cyber Deterrence: Building Stability 
through Strength,” Military and Strategic Affairs 4, no. 3 (2012): 
3­23. 
71  Barton Gellman and Ellen Nakashima, “U.S. Spy Agencies 
Mounted 231 Offensive Cyber-operations in 2011, Documents 
Show,” The Washington Post, August 30, 2013, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-
spy-agencies-mounted-231-offensive-cyber-operations-in-2011-
documents-show/2013/08/30/d090a6ae-119e-11e3-b4cb-
fd7ce041d814_story.html. 
72   Europäische Kommission/Hohe Vertreterin der Europäi-
schen Union für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, Cybersecurity 
Strategy of the European Union – An Open, Safe and Secure Cyber-
space, JOIN(2013) 1 final (Brussels, February 7, 2013). 
tion technologies and to guard fundamental European 
rights and values. The expansion of military and intel-
ligence capabilities are of subordinate importance, 
being mentioned as only one of five main planks of 
the strategy. The other four planks relate to the 
improvement of non-military capacities: resistance to 
cyber attacks, containment of cyber crime, expansion 
of industrial and technical resources for cyber secu-
rity, and the formulation of a unified strategy for 
cyberspace.73 
In the accompanying directive for network and 
information security, which has not yet been adopted, 
the European Commission calls on private sector 
enterprises to play a significant role. In its view, not 
only member states but also private operators have a 
duty to protect critical digital infrastructure. Com-
panies should ensure that their products and services 
always meet certain security standards and are 
shielded against attacks as well as possible.74 The cost 
of installing secure infrastructure for the exchange of 
information between member states is estimated at 
€10 million annually. In June 2013, the EU began to 
require communications companies that offer elec-
tronic communications services “to notify the com-
petent national authorities, and in certain cases also 
the subscribers and individuals concerned, of personal 
data breaches.”75 
The EU’s efforts to bolster cyber crime fighting are 
reflected in the expansion of its new European Cyber 
Crime Centre (EC3). The center is to provide analysis 
and information, assist in investigations, perform 
forensic work, facilitate cooperation among member 
states, inform the private sector and other actors, and 
eventually function as a spokesman for European law 
enforcement as a whole. In its first year, the EC3 as-
73  Patryk Pawlak, Cyber World: Site under Construction (Paris: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies [EUISS], Sep-
tember 2013); Annegret Bendiek, European Cyber Security Policy, 
SWP Research Paper 13/2012 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik, October 2012).  
74  Annegret Bendiek, Kritische Infrastrukturen, Cybersicherheit, 
Datenschutz. Die EU schlägt Pflöcke für digitale Standortpolitik ein, 
SWP-Aktuell 35/2013 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, June 2013). U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
Disclosure Guidance (Washington, DC, July 16, 2013), 
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfdisclosure.shtml. 
75  “Commission Regulation (EU) No 611/2013 of 24 June 
2013 on the measures applicable to the notification of 
personal data breaches under Directive 2002/58/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on privacy and 
electronic communications,” Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 173, 26/06/2013 P. 0002-0008. 
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sisted in the coordination of 19 major cybercrime 
operations.76 
Other EU measures include a pilot project to com-
bat botnets and malware, launched in early 2013 with 
a €15 million budget, and financial support for 
critical infrastructures that link member states’ NIS 
capacities (the Connecting Europe Facility). The 
objective of these measures is comprehensive pro-
tection for assets and people, especially through 
public-private partnerships such as the European 
Public-Private Partnership for Resilience (EP3R) and 
Trust in Digital Life (TDL). Their work is to focus on 
supply chain security and to integrate relevant work 
being conducted by the European standardization 
organizations (Comité Européen de Normalisation, 
CEN; Comité Européen de Coordination des Normes 
Électriques, CENELEC; European Telecommunications 
Standards Institute, ETSI), the Cyber Security Coordi-
nation Group (CSCG), the European Network and 
Information Security Agency (ENISA), the European 
Commission, and other actors involved. Moreover, the 
Framework Program “Horizon 2020” has been set up 
to finance the development of tools to combat crimi-
nal and terrorist activities in cyberspace and support 
work on security research using new information and 
communication technology. The EU’s next multi-
annual financial framework for the period 2014–2020 
includes about €80 billion for “Horizon 2020,” mak-
ing it the EU’s largest ever research program. About 
€1.5 billion is earmarked for security research, and 
€400 million will go to research on cyber security. 
Protection of Critical Infrastructure 
The U.S. Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team (ICS-CERT) reported in July 2012 that 
the number of cyber attacks on critical infrastructure 
in the United States increased from 9 in 2009 to 198 in 
2011.77 It its first report of January 2013, ENISA also 
pointed to the growing risk of cyber attacks on critical 
infrastructure.78 However, the cyber security situation 
76  European Commission, “European Cybercrime Centre – 
one year on,” Press Release, February 10, 2014, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-129_en.htm. 
77  “Sharp Increase in Cyberattacks on U.S. Critical Infra-
structure,” Homeland Security News Wire, July 3, 2012. 
78  “ENISA Reports on Most Frequent Cyber Threats in 2013,” 
Bulletin Quotidien Europe, no. 10759 (9 January 2013); Louis 
Marinos and Andreas Sfakianakis, ENISA Threat Landscape 
(Heraklion, January 8, 2013). 
in Europe is still quite muddled. An obligation to 
report security incidents is currently being discussed 
in the EU and Germany (as in the United States). In the 
absence of officially collected statistics, sporadically 
published national79 or private80 threat analyses 
represent the best available standard of reporting. This 
is something of a handicap, as the exchange of reliable 
information between business, industry, public 
authorities, and security organizations is thought to 
be a central resource in the fight against cybercrime 
and for the protection of critical infrastructure. 
In the United States, debates about cyber security 
over the past two years have increasingly focused on 
the protection of critical infrastructures and on the 
role of private enterprise.81 After a U.S. Senate initia-
tive to regulate the exchange of information on cyber 
threats was blocked by the House of Representatives, 
U.S. President Barack Obama issued an executive order 
on February 12, 201382 requesting businesses to volun-
tarily inform government agencies of cyber attacks.83 
Michael Daniel, cyber security officer at the White 
House, announced in February 2013 his intention to 
have the failed 2012 bill for the protection of critical 
infrastructure reintroduced. In the same month, 
President Obama gathered representatives of leading 
U.S. companies — including UPS, JP Morgan Chase, and 
Exxon Mobil — to discuss cyber threats. The president 
is dependent on voluntary cooperation because digital 
infrastructure in the United States is operated private-
ly. In preparation for its legislative relaunch, the 
administration published the Cyber Security Frame-
work (CSF) “of standards, guidelines, and best prac-
tices to promote the protection of critical infrastruc-
ture” in August 2013. The framework recommends 
mandatory protection standards, and was brought for-
ward as a basis for discussion by the National Institute 
79  See also “ENISA Reports on Most Frequent Cyber Threats” 
(see note 78); Deutsche Telekom/T-Systems (ed.), Cyber Security 
Report 2012. Ergebnisse einer repräsentativen Befragung von Ent-
scheidungsträgern aus Wirtschaft und Politik (Bodman am Boden-
see 2012). 
80  See for instance the website www.sicherheitstacho.eu. 
81  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, The Strategic 
National Risk Assessment in Support of PPD 8: a Comprehensive Risk-
based Approach toward a Secure and Resilient Nation (Washington, 
DC, December 2011). 
82  The White House, Executive Order: Improving Critical Infra-
structure Cybersecurity (Washington, DC, February 12, 2013). 
83  U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Infra-
structure Protection Plan. Partnering to Enhance Protection and 
Resiliency (Washington, DC, 2009), http://www.dhs.gov/ 
national-infrastructure-protection-plan. 
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of Standards and Technology after consultation with 
stakeholders from industry, academia, and govern-
ment.84The credit card breaches at the retailers Target, 
Neiman Marcus, and Michaels resurrected the push 
for a national data breach disclosure law in early 
February 2014. Senate Commerce Committee Chair-
man Jay Rockefeller initiated a federal breach dis-
closure plan. Under the so-called Data Security and 
Breach Notification Act, “the Federal Trade Commis-
sion (FTC) would issue security standards for busi-
nesses that hold people’s personal and financial data. 
If those companies are hacked, they would be required 
to notify affected customers so they can take preven-
tive steps on their own. Businesses would also be given 
incentives to adopt new technologies to make cus-
tomers’ data unreadable or unusable if stolen.”85 
The EU’s goal of achieving unitary, binding regula-
tion is shared by the Obama administration and the 
U.S. Senate but not by the House majority.86 The cur-
rent proposal for a Commission directive proposes to 
require operators of critical infrastructure both to 
protect the information technology they use and to 
optimize communications with regulatory agencies. 
For the Commission, critical infrastructure includes 
not only the energy and transportation sectors but 
also search engines, cloud computing services, social 
networking, Internet payment gateways, and online 
application markets (app stores). All of these com-
panies are to be subject to new requirements on the 
reporting of IT security incidents for the purpose of 
increasing the efficiency of cybercrime fighting. The 
confidentiality of this information is to be guaranteed 
by the ENISA at the European level and by national 
information security authorities of the member states. 
Data Protection 
Interpretations of the proper relationship between 
security and freedom vary widely on both sides of the 
Atlantic and within the EU.87 September 11, 2001 was 
84  National Institute of Standards, Discussion Draft of the Pre-
liminary Cybersecurity Framework, August 28, 2013, 
http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/discussion-draft_preliminary-
cybersecurity-frame work-082813.pdf (accessed October 30, 
2013);http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-bill/3696. 
85  http://thehill.com/blogs/hillicon-valley/technology/197000-
senate-dems-unveil-data-security-bill 
86  Bendiek, Kritische Infrastrukturen (see note 74). 
87  Jim Harper and Axel Spies, A Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy? Data Protection in the United States and Germany, AICGS 
a profound shock to the Americans, but the shock to 
the Spanish was no less after the terrorist attacks in 
Madrid in 2004 or to the British in the wake of the 
London attacks in July 2005. Yet, the experiences of 
other European countries with international and 
Islamic terrorism are different, and these different 
experiences influence their respective approaches and 
the means they consider acceptable for use in the fight 
against terrorism. There is wide disagreement about 
the conditions that would allow government authori-
ties to access private data in the fight against orga-
nized crime or terrorism and on the issue of how long 
personal data may be used for other purposes than 
criminal investigations, if at all. 
The relatively high priority given to national secu-
rity issues in the United States becomes very clear in 
recent disclosures of the monitoring operations of the 
NSA (such as PRISM, Upstream, Xkeyscore, or Bullrun). 
The U.S. government has established a comprehensive 
military-industrial security architecture in the past 
decade and has given its intelligence agencies wide 
discretion to collect any information they consider 
relevant. The fact that the president of the United 
States, perhaps unwittingly, ordered the wiretapping 
of government offices of the EU and its member states, 
even going to the extreme of monitoring the conversa-
tions of heads of government, is only the most obvious 
expression of a security practice that seems to have 
lost a sense of proportion. 
The Unites States still seems to be disregarding the 
political costs of spying on its allies. The monitoring 
program PRISM is defended by the Obama administra-
tion on the grounds that it used only for the collection 
of specific kinds of meta-data and content on specific 
persons, groups, and events. Additionally, it argues 
that all such measures are regulated under the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), are subject 
to judicial review by the United States Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Court (FISA Court), and have to 
be reported to Congress.88 And at any rate, so the 
argument goes, U.S. practice is hardly any different 
from comparable activities of Europe’s own intelli-
Policy Report no. 22 (Washington, DC: American Institute for 
Contemporary German Studies [AICGS], 2006); Quirine 
Eijkman and Daan Weggemans, “Open Source Intelligence 
and Privacy Dilemmas: Is It Time to Reassess State Accounta-
bility?,” Security and Human Rights, no. 4 (2012): 285–96. 
88  Director of National Intelligence, Facts on the Collection of 
Intelligence Pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act (Washington, DC, June 8, 2013). 
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gence services.89 It remains to be seen in how far the 
executive order to reform U.S. intelligence policy, 
introduced by President Obama in January 2014 and 
based on the 46 reform proposals submitted by his 
own review panel, will be implemented in the coming 
months.90 
Resentment against U.S. surveillance practices has 
continued to rise in the EU, especially in Germany. 
Working Party 29 of the EU, an intergovernmental 
working group of data protection officers of the EU 
and its member states created in the mid-1990s, is 
currently investigating whether the United States has 
violated international legal norms or the Budapest 
Convention.91 
The management and use of personal data has been 
another source of dispute between the EU and the 
United States for years. The issue was hotly debated in 
the context of agreements over the transfer of flight 
passenger information (Passenger Name Record or 
PNR) to U.S. agencies and over the exchange of finan-
cial data through the SWIFT system as part of the 
Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP).92 Members 
of parliament have continually cited problems in the 
implementation of the SWIFT agreement, with some 
even calling for a suspension of the agreement. The 
European Parliament warned in a resolution that 
personal data must be protected and that Europe’s 
high standards of protection must not be compro-
mised.93 
European negotiators discussing the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) were urged to 
be on guard against the undermining of EU data 
protection standards. Reforms of the data privacy 
policy of 1995, now under discussion, would prohibit 
the transfer of personal data from EU member states 
to countries that do not have privacy protections 
comparable to those of the European Union. This 
89  Georg Mascolo and Ben Scott, Lessons from the Summer of 
Snowden. The Hard Road Back to Trust (Washington, DC: Open 
Technology Institute/Wilson Center, October 2013). 
90  David E. Sanger and Charlie Savage, “Obama Panel Recom-
mends New Limits on N.S.A. Spying,” TheNew York Times, 
December 18, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/19/ 
us/politics/report-on-nsa-surveillance-tactics.html. 
91  “Article 29 Group to Carry Out Its Own Espionage Investi-
gation,” Bulletin Quotidien Europe, no. 10903 (August 21, 2013). 
92  Annegret Bendiek, An den Grenzen des Rechtsstaates: EU-United 
States-Terrorismusbekämpfung, SWP-Studie 3/2011 (Berlin: Stif-
tung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2011). 
93  Sophie in ’t Veld and Guy Verhofstadt, “Europe Must 
Get Tough with the U.S. over NSA Spying Revelations,” The 
Guardian, July 2, 2013. 
would include the United States. At the same time, 
however, under the “Safe Harbor Framework,” a data 
protection agreement signed in 2000 by the EU and 
the United States, U.S. companies may process Euro-
pean data in the United States if they pledge to uphold 
“safe harbor principles.” In an investigation from 
September 2013, the Australian data protection con-
sulting firm Galexia found that the agreement’s stipu-
lations are often ignored by U.S. companies who have 
pledged compliance. It identified 427 violations of the 
agreement among the nearly 3,000 self-certifying U.S. 
firms investigated; an earlier study from 2008 had 
found only 200.94 The Safe Harbor Framework covers 
trade and economic issues relevant for data protection 
and is therefore treated separately from the EU-U.S. 
agreements that are integrated into national criminal 
law, including PNR, SWIFT, and legal assistance 
treaties. 
In the new draft of EU General Data Protection 
Regulation, the EP has again introduced the so-called 
anti-FISA clause that previously had been deleted by 
the Commission under pressure from the U.S. govern-
ment.95 The clause would prevent businesses from 
providing sensitive data on EU citizens to foreign 
security agencies unless the transfer is covered by a 
mutual legal assistance treaty. Thus, as long as the 
United States and the EU are in disagreement on new 
rules for the exchange of personal data, firms operat-
ing in the United States would have to refuse requests 
from the U.S. government for data on EU citizens. 
Such legal uncertainty puts U.S. companies in a bind. 
In February 2014, Facebook, Yahoo, Google, LinkedIn, 
and Microsoft all revealed that the government had 
asked them for users’ data. Certainly aware of this 
situation, the EP and the justice ministers of the 
member states want to adopt a final draft for the new 
Data Protection Regulation before 2015 that could 
come into effect in 2016. Viviane Reding, EU commis-
sioner for justice, fundamental rights, and citizenship, 
favors the development of a European data protection 
system with four essential components. First, the 
territorial scope of regulations should be clearly and 
expansively defined such that non-European compa-
94  Chris Connolly, The U.S. Safe Harbor – Fact or Fiction? (Syd-
ney: Galexia, December 2008); Chris Connolly, EU/U.S. Safe 
Harbor – Effectiveness of the Framework in Relation to National Secu-
rity Surveillance, October 7, 2013 (Paper for the Hearing in the 
LIBE Committee). 
95  European Centre for International Political Economy, The 
Economic Importance of Getting Data Protection Right: Protecting 
Privacy, Transmitting Data, Moving Commerce, March 2013.  
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nies must be required to comply fully with European 
rules if they want to offer products and services in the 
European market. “If you want to play in our yard, you 
have to play by our rules,” said Reding.96 Second, the 
concept of personal data, too, should be expanded to 
include not only the content of e-mails and telephone 
calls but also traffic data pertaining to that content. 
Third, these rules should apply not only to companies 
that collect data from citizens, but also to companies 
that process data such as cloud providers. Finally, 
there must be protection against unrestricted inter-
national data transfers. Data of EU citizens should be 
given to non-European law enforcement agencies only 
under clearly defined and exceptional circumstances 
and only if subject to judicial review. 
Negotiations over an umbrella agreement between 
the EU and the United States on the modalities of data 
protection have resumed. Europeans want such an 
agreement to result in the strengthening of citizens’ 
rights to access, correct, and delete their own data. 
Also, it should grant EU citizens a right of legal 
redress if their data is unlawfully used in the United 
States. The European position in these negotiations is 
likely to benefit from the fact that the U.S. public has 
become increasingly sensitized to data protection 
issues. Perceived deficits in personal data protection 
and criticism of the surveillance practices of U.S. 
intelligence services are becoming increasingly salient 
politically. Voices across the political spectrum97 and 
in recent decisions of lower-level courts98 have ex-
pressed doubt whether the collection of data on the 
gigantic scale practiced by the NSA is necessary to the 
counter-terrorism effort. Attention has been drawn 
also to the fact that the penetration by intelligence 
agencies of data managed by U.S. high-tech firms 
threatens their reputation and could later have mas-
sive economic consequences. 
96  Viviane Reding, “Reform durchsetzen,” Handelsblatt, 
October 13, 2013, 48. 
97  Two House Republicans, Justin Amash and F. James 
Sensenbrenner, and Democratic Senator Ron Wyden were 
united in criticizing Congress’s failure to check presidential 
power at a conference of the Cato Institute, “NSA Surveil-
lance: What We Know; What to Do about It?” (Washington, DC, 
October 9,2013); commentaries by Jennifer Granick (Center for 
Internet and Society, Stanford Law School), http://cyberlaw. 
stanford.edu/about/people/jennifer-granick. 
98  Ellen Nakashima and Ann E. Marimow, “Judge: NSA’s 
Collecting of Phone Records is Probably Unconstitutional,” 
The Washington Post, December 16, 2013. 
Transnational Conflicts 
The conflict between the United States and the EU on 
issues of personal data protection is politically explo-
sive because it directly affects the relationship be-
tween governments and citizens. Privacy may well be 
an issue in international relations, but above all, it is 
an issue of domestic politics and is a constitutive 
element of the design of public order. The transatlan-
tic partnership will remain stable in the long run only 
if it is anchored in social mores. But this anchorage is 
slipping because the cyber security policies of the 
United States and the EU stand in growing opposition 
to central civil rights, to matters of personal privacy, 
and to the free use of content on the Internet. Current-
ly, these conflicts represent in all likelihood the gravest 
long-term threat to the transatlantic cyber partnership. 
Civil Rights on the Defensive 
NSA spying practices have stoked conflict not only 
between U.S. and European governments but also 
between these governments and their own citizens.99 
For all intents and purposes, a transatlantic inter-
governmental precedent for the wholesale collection 
and analysis of personal communication data has 
been established, a precedent not compatible with 
basic civil rights and liberties.100 Strikingly, the moni-
toring operations of the intelligence services NSA and 
Government Communications Headquarters have met 
with little serious protest from the European govern-
ments who have been targeted for surveillance or 
whose citizens are being spied on. The analysis soft-
ware Xkeyscore is used not only by the NSA but also 
by the German foreign intelligence service (Bundes-
nachrichtendienst). Further, Germany’s domestic intel-
ligence service (BundesamtfürVerfassungsschutz) reported 
that it had been provided with a trial version. In fact, 
99  Laura Poitras, Marcel Rosenbach, and Holger Stark, “Code-
name ‘Apalachee’: How America Spies on Europe and the 
UN,” Der Spiegel, no. 35 (26 August 2013): 85–89; Nicole Perl-
roth, Jeff Larson, and Scott Shane, “N.S.A. Able to Foil Basic 
Safeguards of Privacy on Web,” The New York Times, September 
5, 2013. 
100  Stefan Heumann and Ben Scott, Law and Policy in Internet 
Surveillance Programs: United States, Great Britain and Germany 
(Berlin: Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, September 2013); 
KleineAnfrage der Abgeordneten Dr. Konstantin von Notz et 
al., “Geheime Kooperationsprojekte zwischen deutschen und 
U.S.-Geheimdiensten” (Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahl-
periode, Drucksache 17/14759, September 16, 2013). 
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the federal government even defended U.S. practices 
with the argument that the NSA is undertaking “a 
clearly targeted collection of the communications of 
suspects in the areas of organized crime and the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction for the 
purpose of protecting the national security of the 
United States.”101 Through the summer of 2013, at 
least, the government was still basing its position on 
information provided by U.S. authorities. The govern-
ment also stated then that German citizens were not 
being monitored on a massive scale.102 
The privatization of knowledge extracted from 
mass data is now under critical observation on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The once pervasive Western myth 
that the Internet is a sealed-off virtual world of greater 
privacy and independence from social and political 
institutions103 is being increasingly belied by the facts. 
In a world of cross-border communication flows, citi-
zens are but weakly protected by constitutional rights 
or by legal frameworks — for the regulation of data 
retention, for example — embedded on the national 
or EU levels. Within the EU, the biggest problem is 
that EU countries use retained data not only to com-
bat terrorism and international crime. Under the 
E-Privacy Directive,104 such data may also be used for 
other purposes that need not be clearly defined and 
thus could include crime prevention or the main-
tenance of public order.105 The most important trans-
atlantic legal documents for fighting crime (the Buda-
101  Note the opposing positions taken by the parties out of 
government: Anträge der Fraktionen von SPD (17/14677), Die 
Linke (17/14679) und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (17/14676), in 
heute im bundestag (hib), (September 3, 2013) 444. 
102  Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die KleineAnfrage der 
Abgeordneten Andrej Hunko u.a., “WeltweiteAusforschung 
der Telekommunikation über das U.S.-Programm PRISM,” 
(Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 
17/14602, August 22, 2013). 
103  Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, Die Vernetzung der Welt 
(Reinbek, 2013). 
104  “Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending Directive 
2002/22/EC on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services, Directive 
2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and 
the protection of privacy in the electronic communications 
sector and Regulation (EC) No  2006/2004 on cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement 
of consumer protection law”, Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 337, December 18, 2009; “Corrigendum to Directive 
2009/136/EG,” Official Journal of the European Union, L 241, 
September 10, 2013. 
105  “Im Gespräch: EU-Innenkommissarin Cecilia Malm-
ström,” Frankfurter AllgemeineZeitung, July 4, 2013. 
pest Convention) and for transferring international 
law to cyber warfare (Tallinn Manual) show little 
sensitivity for citizens’ rights. 
The Budapest Convention is highly controversial 
among human rights activists and privacy advocates. 
Article 16 of the convention stipulates that service pro-
viders must retain stored computer data for 90 days so 
that prosecuting authorities in criminal cases can gain 
access to these data under conventional law enforce-
ment and legal aid treaties. The duration of storage 
can be extended on the request of one party. The con-
vention also makes it possible for signatory states to 
provide real-time monitoring of traffic and connection 
data and even content. Service providers must also 
provide law enforcement authorities with customers’ 
personal information at the behest of those authori-
ties, even if the person is only a preliminary suspect. 
Companies operating in the United States must allow 
U.S. authorities access to data stored in Europe. Any 
information that an intelligence service is barred from 
collecting in its own country is collected and shared 
by an affiliated intelligence service. 
The Tallinn Manual, too, has come under fire in 
this context. The broad definition of a military attack 
does not in principle ban governments from taking 
military action against non-state groups or even 
individual alleged hackers. The U.S. Department of 
Defense broadened its authority and ability to combat 
attacks directed not only against its own systems, but 
also against private computers, including infrastruc-
ture abroad. Through this avenue, it is feared, warfare 
can become increasingly denationalized and the 
boundaries between police and military operations 
even more blurred. Given that the military is not 
required to respect due process or protect civil rights 
in its operations, there is a danger that the ethics of 
the drone war against terror could come to dominate 
cyber defense. 
It is noteworthy that intergovernmental relations 
in the transatlantic cyber partnership are robust and 
healthy, but its ties to civil society are feeble. In cyber 
security and Internet governance, governing practices 
have started to become separated from the preroga-
tives of civil rights protection. A prime example is the 
diametrically opposed views of government officials 
and civil rights activists about how Edward Snowden’s 
actions should be treated under the law.106 Whenever 
a government reacts to newly perceived security 
106  Nikolaj Nielsen, “Snowden to EU: Whistleblowers Need 
Protection,” EUobserver, October 1, 2013. 
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threats by arrogating to itself new powers, it inevita-
bly creates new threats to civil society.107 It is therefore 
not surprising that civil society organizations have 
already brought suit against government policy in the 
European Court of Human Rights. Three of the most 
respected British civil society organizations (Big 
Brother Watch, Open Rights Group, and the English 
PEN) have filed a lawsuit against Great Britain, claim-
ing that the wiretapping practices of GCHQ are con-
trary to Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. They argue that the wholesale collec-
tion of British citizens’ communications data, includ-
ing persons not suspected of doing anything wrong, 
violates privacy protections.108 In the United States, 
too, several lawsuits against NSA surveillance practices 
are still pending. 
Human Security on the Defensive 
Defense industry firms are increasingly turning out 
new products in the field of cyber security in the 
attempt to compensate for profit losses incurred 
because of cutbacks in weapons contracts.109 They 
secure networks, build firewalls, and simulate hacker 
attacks. Sales in cyber security are currently growing 
by 10 percent annually.110 Defense firms have bought 
several specialized technology companies, acquiring 
their software expertise. The U.S. company Raytheon 
has acquired 11 IT firms since 2007, most recently 
Teligy, a company that specializes in wireless commu-
nication.111 The defense company Cassidian is plan-
ning to increase the number of its cyber experts to 700 
in the coming years. Defense firms traditionally were 
107  “Wenn die Macht schweigt. Ilija Trojanow, Juli Zeh und 
der Geheimdienst im Netz,” in Süddeutsche Zeitung, October 4, 
2013, 11; John Lanchester, “The Snowden Files: Why the 
British Public Should Be Worried about GCHQ,” The Guardian, 
October 3, 2013; Ken Auletta, “Freedom of Information. A 
British Newspaper Wants to Take Its Aggressive Investigations 
Global, but Money Is Running Out,” The New Yorker, October 7, 
2013. 
108  Constanze Kurz, “Die Menschenrechte sollen es richten,” 
Frankfurter AllgemeineZeitung, October 4, 2013, 38. 
109  Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), 
SIPRI Yearbook 2013 (Stockholm et al., 2013), Chapter 3 (Mili-
tary Expenditure), Point I (Global Developments in Military 
Expenditure). 
110  PricewaterhouseCoopers, Cyber Security M & A. Decoding 
Deals in the Global Cyber Security Industry (November 2011), 5. 
111  Ryan Gallagher, “Software that Tracks People on Social 
Media Created by Defence Firm,” The Guardian, February 10, 
2013. 
shielded from market competition, but they now 
compete with civilian companies such as Intel and 
Dell in the markets for IT security. This expansion of 
defense firms into the IT branch will serve to blur the 
boundaries between civilian and military enterprises, 
a trend that is well illustrated by the British defense 
contractor BAE’s plans to cooperate with the mobile 
communications company Vodafone.112 
The human rights organization Privacy Inter-
national lists around 160 companies whose software 
products can also be used to monitor or suppress 
dissidents.113 A majority of the companies are based in 
Europe or the United States. Through the export of 
their software, they help authoritarian governments 
suppress free speech and violate human rights. Their 
actions hinder the spread of democracy and under-
mine long-term global political stability. Companies 
that put insecure software on the market likewise 
facilitate the surveillance activities of authoritarian 
states.114 Cyber security technology can raise the same 
kinds of ethical issues as traditional weapons tech-
nology. The Munich-based firm Gamma International 
is a good example. It sells a malware product of its 
own development, FinFisher, that can spy on com-
puters and eavesdrop on mobile phone conversations. 
Working with partners, the company sells the program 
worldwide to police agencies and intelligence services. 
Human rights activists accuse Gamma International 
of selling to dictators. The company has responded 
that it consults the export control lists of Germany, 
Great Britain, and the United States before each 
sale.115 Gamma International is not the only company 
under criticism. The Swedish telecommunications 
company TeliaSonera has exported its products to the 
successor states of the Soviet Union, and the U.S. net-
work equipment company BlueCoat has provided 
surveillance technology to countries such as Iran, 
Syria, Sudan, North Korea, and Cuba, which are sub-
ject to U.S. sanctions, or to countries that have com-
mitted massive human rights violations and have 
112  “A Strategic Partnership with Vodafone,” BAESystems, 
February 17, 2013. 
113  Privacy International, “Global Surveillance Monitor,” 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/projects/global-
surveillance-monitor; Wall Street Journal, “Surveillance 
Catalog”, http://projects.wsj.com/surveillance-catalog/#/. 
114  “Russland plant die totale Überwachung im Inter-
net,”Deutsche Wirtschafts-Nachrichten, October 21, 2013. 
115  Hanna Lütke-Lanfer, “Ein Trojaner für den König,” 
Die Zeit, February 14, 2013. 
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suppressed opposition groups, such as Egypt, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. 
Critics are therefore of the opinion that export 
controls for sensitive software should be reformed so 
as to hold exporting companies and the export control 
regimes of EU member states to a higher standard of 
accountability.116 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
Citizen Lab, and Privacy International have put for-
ward important proposals for improving controls. 
They suggest that businesses be allowed to export 
critical software only to countries that protect human 
rights or that at least allow opposition groups un-
hindered freedom of expression. Under this proposal, 
the protection of human rights would be made a 
prerequisite for receiving a temporary license that 
would have to be rescinded should human rights 
violations occur after purchase. Another suggestion is 
to label software with the exact conditions under 
which it may be used. In this way, businesses could be 
required to prove that the use of their software is tied 
to specific conditions. In addition, some surveillance 
tools like Trojans could be classified as weapons and 
thus made subject to stricter authorization regula-
tions. 
Current export controls are ill-fitted to digital tech-
nology and need to be adapted to the Internet age.117 
The Obama administration issued an executive order 
in April 2012 to prevent the export of information and 
communication technology to Iran and Syria. It also 
placed export controls on software that enables sur-
reptitious listening. The EU, too, imposed an embargo 
on Syria and currently prohibits the export of “dual-
use” goods (products, technologies, and knowledge 
that can serve both civilian and military purposes) to 
countries under arms embargo, but it currently does 
not systematically check the human rights situation 
in technology-purchasing countries. The EP announced 
in September 2011 that it favors tighter regulation of 
surveillance technology exports, especially of dual-use 
goods. Individual states such as the Netherlands and 
Denmark have proposed making the granting of 
export permits for sensitive goods dependent on a 
stricter, mandatory review of human rights and 
democracy in receiving countries. In a response from 
October 2011 to the Green Paper of the European 
Commission on the dual-use control system of the 
116  Wolfgang Ischinger, “Mehr Macht dem Parlament,” 
Handelsblatt, August 30, 2012: 56. 
117  Danielle Kehl and Tim Maurer, Against Hypocrisy: Updating 
Export Controls for the Digital Age (Washington, DC/New York: 
New America Foundation, March 9, 2013). 
European Union, the German federal government 
expressly demanded that in the future, balanced 
consideration should be given to foreign and security 
policy issues as well as business interests.118 EU mem-
ber states want to implement effective measures to 
adapt control mechanisms to political and technical 
developments, but they want to do it primarily at the 
international level.119 The German federal government 
is taking part in related negotiations within the frame-
work of the Wassenaar Arrangement.120 
Freedom of Use versus Copyright Protection 
Critics fear that Internet freedoms are increasingly 
being subordinated to the logic of product commer-
cialization in markets. Symptomatic of this debate 
were disputes, lasting until 2012, over the Anti-Coun-
terfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), a saga that 
began in 2007 when the EU and the United States an-
nounced121 their intention to organize international 
cooperation against product piracy and counterfeiting 
in conjunction with countries such as Japan, Canada, 
Korea, Mexico, Morocco, New Zealand, and Switzer-
land. A trade agreement was sought that makes the 
commercial exploitation of intellectual property more 
secure and that protects consumers against the health 
and safety hazards associated with counterfeit pro-
ducts. When this original objective was then expanded 
to encompass the Internet and copyright infringement, 
ACTA became noticeably more political. The agree-
ment that emerged provided for some quite severe 
penalties, even the blockage of Internet accounts. For 
many protesters, the contract is symbolic of the greater 
problem that a mere extension of the “intellectual 
118  Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die KleineAnfrage der 
Abgeordneten Dr. Konstantin von Notz u.a., “Haltung der 
Bundesregierung bezüglich des Exports von ‘Dual-use-Gütern’ 
im Bereich der Technologie zur Störung von Telekommuni-
kationsdiensten sowie Techniken zur Überwachung und 
Unterbrechung des Internetverkehrs durch deutsche Firmen” 
(Berlin: Deutscher Bundestag, 17. Wahlperiode, Drucksache 
17/8052, December 2, 2011): 2. 
119  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and 
Security, 2013 Report on Foreign Policy-based Export Control 
(Washington, DC, 2013). 
120  http://www.wassenaar.org. Guido Westerwelle, Ewa 
Björling, Laurent Fabius, and William Hague, “So muss der 
Waffenhandel global reguliert werden,” Financial Times 
Deutschland, July 2, 2012: 24. 
121  Stefan Krempl, “EU und United States treiben Abkom-
men gegen Produktpiraterie voran,” heise.de, October 24, 
2007. 
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property” system prevents the adaptation of copyright 
law to the needs of the digital society. As protests 
grew, the European Parliament announced its opposi-
tion to the agreement in July 2012. For most observers, 
this spelled the end of an initiative championed by 
leading industrial nations and worked out largely 
behind closed doors.122 
In current debates on the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), many of the same critiques of the 
ACTA reappear.123 The TTIP is intended to tighten 
transatlantic protections in patent or copyright law 
and will probably include a dispute settlement pro-
cedure by which corporations could bring suit against 
nation states over regulations that are harmful to 
their interests. The settlement procedure exists al-
ready: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) was 
originally created to protect investors from arbitrary 
government regulations and court decisions in coun-
tries with inadequate legal protections. The procedure 
has come to be used mainly by U.S. corporations. 
Parties not involved in the dispute are not granted 
access to the adjudication proceedings; typically, the 
U.S. parties involved voluntarily grant industrial 
associations complete access to the process while 
withholding information from other interested actors. 
Decisions may not be appealed. The “Seattle to Brus-
sels” network warns in a report entitled “A Brave New 
Transatlantic Partnership” that the new trade agree-
ment could revive the “spirit of ACTA” by expanding 
the number of cases heard under ISDS.124 
The Foundation for a Free Information Infrastruc-
ture (FFII) also rejects the ISDS procedure125 because 
companies could use it to weaken user rights in copy-
right law or to block “fair use” provisions currently 
under discussion. In U.S. copyright law, the “fair use” 
clause generally allows forms of use that do not 
threaten conventional value chains. Article 5 of the EU 
Copyright Directive (InfoSoc Directive), in contrast, 
grants exceptions from copyright protection only in 
enumerated instances. Copyright regulations are 
122  Stefan Krempl, “EU Parlament beerdigt ACTA,” heise.de, 
July 4, 2012. 
123  Stefan Krempl, “Transatlantisches Freihandelsabkom-
men: ‘Schlimmer als ACTA’,” heise.de, October 11, 2013. 
124  Kim Bizzarri, A Brave New Transatlantic Partnership (Brus-
sels: Seattle to Brussels Network, October 2013), 
http://www.s2bnetwork.org/fileadmin/dateien/downloads/ 
Brave_New_Atlantic_ Partnership.pdf. 
125  “FFII Condemns Investor-to-state Arbitration in Trade 
Talks with U.S.,” FFII Acta Blog, June 14, 2013. 
therefore more restrictive in Europe. The European 
approach so far has been less a problem for end-users 
than for innovative companies. Most copyright col-
lectives are smart enough not to seek prosecution of 
individuals who infringe on copyright law but rather 
bring suit against companies whose services make 
such infringements possible in one way or another. 
For this reason, a greater number of innovative ser-
vices arise in the United States than in Europe.126 
 
126  Leonhard Dobusch, “Urheberrecht: Standortfaktor für 
digitale Innovationsoffenheit,” in Kompendium Digitale Stand-
ortpolitik, ed.Baums and Scott (see note 12): 116f. 
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The transatlantic cyber partnership stands on a firm 
foundation of common principles and institutions, 
but it does not stand above the eroding effects of 
political controversy. The partnership is currently 
being tested. Its long-term stability requires that both 
sides overcome a number of serious differences. 
1. In the continuing debates over cyber security, 
Internet governance, data protection, and surveil-
lance of allies, it is important for both sides to 
recognize each other as equal partners. This means 
that the United States must give up its anachro-
nistic attempts at unilaterally setting the rules of 
appropriate state behavior in international rela-
tions. At the same time, Europeans must develop a 
common position on all the relevant issues and 
engage the United States with one voice. This holds 
true today and will continue to hold true for years 
to come. In the medium term, it will be necessary 
for select NATO countries including the United 
States to commit to “no-spy” agreements with one 
another. Meanwhile, European states must endeav-
or to prevent the gap between insider and outsider 
states from widening. The emergence of a two-class 
society of informed and uninformed EU member 
states would be immensely harmful to the Euro-
pean project of integration.  
2. Lost trust must be rebuilt among allied democra-
cies. The disclosure of the NSA’s transatlantic 
spying practices has deeply disrupted mutual 
confidence among the governments involved in the 
“wider transatlantic partnership.” This is seen, for 
example, in Brazil and Germany’s initiative to 
amend the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights with provisions eschewing espio-
nage of cosignatory governments. It is certainly 
remarkable that two of the United States’ most 
important allies consider it necessary to adjust 
international legal standards in order to keep their 
friend under better control. The significance of this 
action cannot be overestimated, for it represents 
nothing less than a deep crisis of confidence in the 
transatlantic partnership. Both sides need to be 
aware that the idea of a free and open Internet can 
be realized only if there is consensus not only on 
how the Internet should be governed but also on 
why transatlantic cooperation in Internet gover-
nance and cyber security is meaningful. All at-
tempts of authoritarian states to gain greater state 
control of critical content must be rejected decisive-
ly. To this end, the United States, the EU, and other 
democratic nations must work especially closely, 
because only together will they be able to set global 
standards and preserve the openness and freedom 
of the Internet. Importantly, neither the United 
States nor Europe can achieve its governance objec-
tives without the other.  
3. The Internet has become vital for the continuing 
health and growth of more than one area of social 
intercourse and will certainly play a positive role in 
maintaining a sustainable public order in the 
future. This means that the transatlantic partner-
ship must also be anchored transnationally if it is 
to be stable in the long term. Citizens on both sides 
of the Atlantic have become more acutely aware 
than ever before of the drawbacks to digitalization, 
and calls for a renationalization of communication 
structures are more noticeable. A major transparen-
cy initiative is now necessary to stave off this threat-
ening development. It is essential to comprehen-
sively inform the public about U.S. and European 
industrial and security data usage practices and to 
make clear why this public disclosure is necessary. 
Anything less would leave unchecked the current 
erosion of trust between governments and citizens, 
and losing this trust would mean losing a most 
precious asset for the maintenance of liberal democ-
racy. 
4. The realization must also set in that the three major 
issues of cyber security, Internet governance, and 
data protection are a single policy package. Too 
often, the three topics are treated independently of 
each other, without insight into the complexity of 
their interaction. Further, cyber security will be 
elusive as long as important countries like Turkey, 
Brazil, India, and South Africa are not included in 
Internet governance and its analysis. The same 
applies to countries like Russia and China, whose 
inclusion is more difficult to achieve but impera-
tive nonetheless. Finally, both sides might realize 
that deterrence alone does not create security, nor 
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will narrowly focused reforms of data protection 
law by themselves make for a comprehensive data 
usage policy. It is extremely important to under-
stand that the state plays a different role in each of 
the three areas of Internet governance, cyber secu-
rity, and data protection. The globalized world is 
based on cross-border digitization of infrastructure, 
of value chains, and of life worlds. In the future, for 
reasons of security, states must play a more active 
role in the protection of critical infrastructure than 
they have played in the economic and technical 
development of value chains. For the time being, 
private actors and others involved in autonomous 
multistakeholder coordination should step up and 
do their work. For the regulation of interaction in 
social networks and in the social environment 
generally, however, we should insist that state 
intervention is acceptable only under very narrowly 
defined conditions. 
5. The fact that the three major issues of cyber secu-
rity, Internet governance, and data protection are 
intimately connected should have consequences for 
the openness to consultation at the highest admin-
istrative levels. Reciprocal consultation must take 
place among the various responsible Directorates 
General of the European Commission and the 
General Secretariat of the Council of the European 
Union and among the relevant subordinate de-
partments of interior, defense, economic, and 
justice ministries on both sides of the Atlantic. The 
United States already has a cyber coordinator, a 
position created in 2009 at the State Department. 
The EU has yet to take such a step. It is also impera-
tive that the transatlantic dialog among legislators 
on matters of cyber security, Internet governance, 
data protection, and data use be intensified and 
expanded to include civil society actors. Policy-
makers in cyber security, Internet governance, and 
data policy should take account of concerns brought 
up by civil society activists and by the scientific 
community in every step of the coordination pro-
cess. Only then can a long-term transatlantic cyber 
partnership come to rest on a firm foundation of 
values shared by governments across the Atlantic 
and by governments and citizens transnationally. 
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ACTA Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
BDI Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
BSI BundesamtfürSicherheit in der Informations-
technik (German Federal Office for Information 
Security) 
CDC SC Cyber Defence Coordination and Support Center 
CDMB  Cyber Defence Management Board 
CEN ComitéEuropéen de Normalisation 
CENELEC  ComitéEuropéen de Coordination des 
NormesÉlectriques 
CERTs  Computer Emergency Response Teams 
CIA Central Intelligence Agency (United States) 
CSBMs Confidence and Security Building Measures 
CSCG Cyber Security Coordination Group 
CSIS Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(Washington, DC) 
DPPC Defence Policy and Planning Committee 
EC3 European Cybercrime Centre 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 
ENISA European Network and Information Security 
Agency 
EP European Parliament 
EP3R European Public-Private Partnership for Resilience 
ETSI European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
EU European Union 
EUISS European Union Institute for Security Studies 
(Paris) 
FCC Federal Communications Commission (United 
States) 
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
FISAA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act 
G8 Group of Eight (the seven leading Western 
industrialized nations plus Russia) 
GCHQ Government Communications Headquarters (GB) 
IBSA India, Brazil, and South Africa Dialogue Forum 
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force 
IGF Internet Governance Forum 
ISDS Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
ISOC Internet Society 
IT Information Technology 
ITR International Telecommunication Regulations 
ITU International Telecommunication Union 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
NATO C3B NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board 
NCIRC NATO Computer Incident Response Capability 
NIS Net and Information Security 
NRO National Reconnaissance Office (United States) 
NSA National Security Agency (United States) 
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OSCE  Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
 Europe 
PEN  Poets, Essayists, Novelists 
PNR  Passenger Name Record 
SCS  Special Collection Service 
TDL  Trust in Digital Life 
TFTP  Terrorist Finance Tracking Program 
TPP  Trans-Pacific Partnership 
TTIP  Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
 Partnership 
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command 
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 
UN  United Nations 
WCIT  World Conference on International 
 Telecommunications 
WGIG  Working Group on Internet Governance 
WSIS  World Summit on the Information Society 
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